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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS: Religion
Badoni v. Higginson, No. 78-1517 (10th Cir. Nov. 3, 1980). Individual members, medicine men and local organizations of the
Navajo Nation brought an action for injunctive and declaratory
relief against the Secretary of Interior, Commissioner of the
Bureau of Reclamation, and the Director of the National Park
Service. Their claim was that the management of the Rainbow
Bridge National Monument, Glen Canyon Dam, and Lake
Powell violated their rights under the free exercise clause of the
first amendment. Their complaint included claims that (1)
by impounding water to form Lake Powell some of the Navajo
gods had been drowned and a sacred prayer spot had been flooded,
and (2) by allowing tourists to have access to these sites the
government had permitted desecration to the sacred nature of the
site.
Regarding the first claim, plaintiffs asked that the water level
in Lake Powell be lowered. As to the second infringement, plaintiffs asked that tourists be required to act in an orderly and
dignified manner and that they be excluded at certain times so that
religious ceremonies could be conducted in private. The district
court denied their claims, saying that they had no property interest
in the area, and even if they did, the government's interest
outweighed their religious interest in this case. The Tenth Circuit,
while noting that the lack of a property interest is not determinative, nevertheless upheld the lower court's decision by applying the two-part test enunciated in Wisconsin v. Yoder' dealing
with free exercise claims, i.e., (1) it must be shown that the act
does have a coercive effect on plaintiff's religion thereby violating
plaintiff's first amendment right, and unless (2) the government's
interest outweighs the plaintiff's religious interest. The Tenth Circuit held that maintaining Lake Powell at its current level for the
purpose of multistate water storage and power generation
outweighed the plaintiffs' interest in having it lowered. In addition, the court held that the government had taken no action to
prohibit plaintiffs' practice of religion at the Rainbow Bridge,
and that for the government affirmatively to require tourists to
stay off public lands while the Indians exercised their religion
would be a clear violation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment. As to requiring tourists to act in a courteous man1. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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ner, the court stated that tourists' conduct is already regulated so
as to promote and preserve the monument and the plaintiffs have
no right to require others to conform their conduct to their own
religious necessities.

CIVIL RIGHTS: Religion
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir. 1980), members of the Cherokee Tribe brought an action to
enjoin the completion of the Tellico Dam and the subsequent
flooding of the Little Tennessee Valley in Monroe County, Tennessee. The complaint was that flooding the valley would infringe
on the free exercise of tribal religion because Cherokee medicine
men gathered medicine from the valley, and they believed the
valley to be the birthplace of the Cherokees. In addition, the
valley was the burial place of many Indians, all of which would
be destroyed if the valley was flooded. The court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee dismissed the suit on the ground that the
complaintants lacked a property interest in the valley and,
therefore, had no first amendment claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision but stated that the lack of a
property interest will not always preclude a free exercise claim.
Instead the decision was based on the analysis enunciated in the
United States Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Yoder.' The
Sixth Circuit stated that the interests espoused by the Indians
were more cultural and historical than religious because they had
not demonstrated that worship in the valley was inseparable from
their way of life as required by Yoder. Instead, the interests
claimed showed no more than the individual personal preferences
of the complaintants rather than the religious beliefs of the
Cherokees as a whole. Because of this, the court held that there
had been no infringement of a first amendment right of the
Cherokee Nation.

EMPLOYMENT: BIA Indian Preference
In Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 100 S. Ct. 1905 (1980), the
United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the "Buy Indian" Act, 25 U.S.C. § 47, which directs the Secretary of the In1. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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terior to employ Indian labor "so far as may be practicable," and
which permits him to purchase "the products of Indian industry...
in open market," does not authorize the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to enter into road construction contracts with Indianowned companies without first advertising for bids pursuant to
Title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949.
In 1976, the Bureau of Indian Affairs formally adopted the
procurement policy that "all [BIA] purchases or contracts be
made or entered into with qualified Indian contractors to the
maximum practicable extent." Accordingly, the BIA announced
that in every procurement situation it would consider dealing with
non-Indian contractors only after it had determined that there
were "no qualified Indian contractors within the normal competitive area that can fill or are interested in filling the procurement requirement."
In 1977, subsequent to soliciting bids from three Indian-owned
construction companies, the BIA awarded a contract to build a
road in Pushmataha County, Oklahoma, to the Indian Nations
Construction Company. The Indian Nations Construction Company is a corporation owned and controlled exclusively by Indians and the only Indian-owned company to actually place a bid
on the project. Thereafter, the Glover Construction Company, a
non-Indian corporation engaged as a general contractor in road
building, filed suit alleging that the BIA was required by Title III
to advertise publicly for bids. Section 252(c) of Title III mandates
that "all purchases and contracts for property and services shall
be made by advertising . . . ." The district court granted summary judgment to Glover Construction and declared the contract
with Indian Nations Construction Company to be null and void,
and permanently enjoined the BIA from circumventing the advertising requirements of 41 U.S.C. § 253. A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, stating that while it was
debatable whether the language of the Buy Indian Act would cover
letting contracts for road construction, section 252(e) of Title
III specifically states that section 252(c) "shall not be construed
to ... permit any contract for the construction or repair of ...
roads . . . to be negotiated without advertising . .. ."
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HUNTING RIGHTS: Eagle Protection Act
In United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980),
Fryberg, a member of the Tululip Indian Tribe, was found guilty
by the district court of violating the Eagle Protection Act for killing a bald eagle without a permit.' At the time of the alleged
violation, Fryberg was on the Tululip Reservation. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the issue became
whether the Eagle Protection Act modified treaty hunting rights
granted to Fryberg pursuant to the Treaty of Point Elliott. 2
Fryberg relied heavily on United States v. White3 where the
Eighth Circuit held that the Act did not abrogate the treaty hunting rights of the Red Lake Chippewa Indians. The court further
stated that to modify such rights requires Congress to do so expressly which it had not done in the Act. The Ninth Circuit,
although recognizing White, believed the Eighth Circuit had construed the Act too narrowly, overlooking the broad wording of
the Act, which purports to cover anyone within the United States
or anyplace subject to the jurisdiction thereof and the pervasive
purpose of the Act, i.e., the protection of bald and golden eagles.
The court stated that congressional intent to modify or abrogate
treaty rights may be clear from the surrounding circumstances
and legislative history despite the absence of a clear expression by
Congress. The Ninth Circuit also relied heavily on the fact that
there was a provision in the Act whereby Indians could get a permit from the Secretary of Interior to use eagle specimens for
religious purposes. The court reasoned by implication from this
provision that it was the intent of Congress to modify Indians'
hunting rights and to include them within the Act's coverage.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit surveyed a series of Supreme Court
cases that dealt with the effect of conservation statutes, such as
this Act, on Indian treaty rights, finding that such rights could be
affected when (1) the sovereign has jurisdiction over an area of
which it seeks to exercise its police power for conservation, (2)
when the statute is nondiscriminatory (applies equally to treaty
and nontreaty persons), and (3) the treaty modification must be
necessary to achieve the conservation purposes of the statute.
Here, the Ninth Circuit found the Act met all three of these
requirements and, thus, it affirmed Fryberg's conviction.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668 et seq. (1940).
2. 12 Stat. 927 (1859).
3. 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/11

19801

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS: State Regulation
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. Oklahoma, No. 78-150 (10th Cir.,
Mar. 25, 1980). The Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma
brought an action to enjoin the state of Oklahoma from exercising jurisdiction over Indian hunting and fishing on land allotted
to individual Indians and on land held in trust by the United
States for the Indians. The tribes claim was that such land constituted "Indian country" which cannot be regulated by the state
absent an express mandate by Congress. The district court held
that the trust lands were not Indian country and therefore the
state could regulate Indian hunting and fishing on these lands. It
further held that the Assimilative Crimes Act' extended state
jurisdiction over Indian hunting and fishing. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court decision,
recognizing that 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) expressly defines Indian
allotments as a part of Indian country. The Tenth Circuit further
held that United States v. John2 and the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act,3 as well as the Solicitor's interpretation of this Act,"
brings these trust lands within the definition of Indian country,
hence preventing state jurisdiction over either allottment or trust
land. In overturning the lower court's reliance on the Assimilative
Crimes Act, the Tenth Circuit stated that this Act does not
assimilate state law that is inconsistent with federal policies expressed in federal statutes. 5 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) expressly protects Indian hunting and fishing rights; therefore, the Act could
not extend state jurisdiction over these areas.
INDIAN CLAIMS: Treaty Abrogation
At issue in United States v. Sioux Nation, 100 S. Ct. 2716 (1980),
was the abrogation by the United States of the Fort Laramie
Treaty of 1868, under which the United States pledged that the
Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills, would be "set
apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of
the Sioux Nation, and that no treaty for the cession of any part
of the reservation would be valid as against the Sioux unless ex1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

18 U.S.C. § 13 (1940).
437 U.S. 634 (1978).
56 Stat. 21 (1942).
59 Int. Dept. Dec. 1, 3.
No. 78-150 (10th Cir., Mar. 25, 1980).
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ecuted and signed by at least three-fourths of the adult male
Sioux population. The treaty also reserved the Sioux's right to
hunt in certain unceded territories. However, in 1877, Congress
passed an act abrogating the Fort Laramie Treaty based upon an
"agreement" presented to the Sioux by a special commission but
signed only by 10 percent of the adult male Sioux population.
This "agreement" provided that the Sioux would relinquish their
rights to the Black Hills and their right to hunt in the unceded
territories in exchange for subsistence rations as long as they were
needed.
In 1923 the Sioux brought suit in the Court of Claims alleging
that the government had taken the Black Hills without just
compensation, in violation of the fifth amendment. In 1942 the
Court of Claims dismissed on the ground that the Court of
Claims was not authorized to determine whether the compensation agreed to in the 1877 "agreement" was an adequate price for
the Black Hills.
Thereafter, upon enactment of the Indian Claims Commission
Act in 1946, the Sioux resubmitted their claim to the Indian
Claims Commission, which held that the 1887 Act effected a taking
for which the Sioux were entitled to just compensation and that
the 1942 Court of Claims decision did not bar the taking claim
under res judicata.
The government appealed to the Court of Claims, which held
that the merits of the Sioux's claim had been reached in its 1942
decision, and therefore, such claim was barred by res judicata
even though the court did concede that there was evidence of a
want of fair and honorable dealing on the part of the government.
Subsequently, in 1978, Congress passed an act providing for de
novo review by the Court of Claims of the taking of the Black
Hills without regard to the defense of res judicata. Accordingly,
the court held that the Sioux were entitled to an award of interest
at an annual rate of 5 percent on the sum of $17.1 million. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon Cherokee
Nation v. United States' as authority to the effect that Congress
has the power to waive a judgment that would be res judicata as
part of its power to pay the debts of the United States. Further,
the court reasoned, the principle that it "must [be] presume[d]
that Congress acted in perfect good faith in dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that [it] exercised its best
1. 270 U.S. 476 (1926).
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judgment in the premises," 2 is inapplicable in this case. And
upon consideration of the evidence, the court concluded that the
congressional undertaking in 1877 to furnish the Sioux with rations was not intended to provide a fair equivalent for the value
of the Black Hills but rather was an attempt to coerce the tribe
into capitulating to congressional demands. Therefore, the 1877
Act was not merely a change in the form of investment of Indian
tribal property, which Congress had the power to make as trustee
for the tribe, but rather a taking without compensation. Consequently, that taking implied an obligation on the part of the
government to make just compensation to the Sioux Nation, and
that obligation, including interest, must now, at last, be paid.
JURISDICTION: Zoning
Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe,
No. C78-3597 (9th Cir., Dec. 24, 1980). The Muckleshoot Indian

Tribe appealed a district court decision enjoining them from enforcing a tribal business licensing ordinance against TransCanada Enterprises, Ltd. After Trans-Canada had continually
refused to comply with the tribal ordinance, the tribe got an
injunction in tribal court to prevent Trans-Canada from construction of its development, in order to force compliance with
the ordinance. Trans-Canada then obtained an injunction in
federal district court against the tribe's enforcement of the ordinance, asserting that the ordinance violated due process and
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.
The district court held that it had jurisdiction over the case by
virtue of the alleged fourteenth amendment violations, and
hence, federal question jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court, holding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that the lower
court's reliance on a federal question to invoke jurisdiction was
incorrect because constitutional guarantees are not applicable to
the exercise of governmental powers by an Indian tribe except to
the extent that they are made explicitly binding by the Constitution or are imposed by Congress. Here, they had not been. Further, the court could not assert jurisdiction under the Indian Civil
Rights Act' because the sole federal remedy under this Act is
application for federal habeas corpus relief.
2. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
1. 25 U.S.C.A. (1968).
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LAND ALLOTMENTS: Governmental Responsibility
Under the General Allotment Act
In United States v. Mitchell, 100 S.Ct. 1349 (1980), suit was
brought on behalf of 1,465 individual allottees of land on the
Quinault Reservation in Washington for money damages for
alleged breaches of trust in connection with mismanagement of
forest resources situated on lands allocated to individual Indians
under the General Allotment Act of 1887. The United States
Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Claims, held that the
General Allotment Act cannot be read as establishing that the
United States has a fiduciary responsibility for management of
allotted forest lands.
A literal reading of the statute provides that "the United States
does and will hold the land thus allotted ...

in trust for the sale,

use and benefit of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have
been made . .

. ."

However, the Supreme Court took the view

that the language imposing the trust must be read in para materia
with other provisions of the Act, which, in Justice Marshall's
words, "created only a limited trust relationship between the
United States and the allottee that does not impose any duty
upon the government to manage timber resources.'
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, wrote a
dissenting opinion to the view that the word "trust" in the Act
was intended to create a trust as that word is commonly
understood. The dissent states, "This language would surely be a
sufficient manifestation of intent to create a trust if the settlor
were other than the United States." ' 2 Further, the statute was
enacted "against a backdrop of a relationship between the United
States and the Indian tribes that had long been considered to
"resemble that of a ward to his guardian." 3

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: Waiver Via ICRA
On June 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
handed down its decision in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe
& Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980). The circuit
1. 100 S.Ct. at 1354.
2. Id. at 1357.
3. Id.
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court affirmed its earlier decision in the case despite Santa Clara.'
The central issue in Dry Creek was whether the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA)2 waived tribal sovereign immunity as to suits
brought against them by non-Indians under the Act.
The plaintiffs in this case were non-Indians who owned land in
fee within the exterior boundaries of the Wind River Reservation
of the Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes. The plantiffs constructed a
guest lodge for hunting (Dry Creek Lodge) after consultation
with the superintendent of the reservation. The superintendent
encouraged the project and said there should be no access problem. The access road from Dry Creek Lodge to the principal
highway was over certain tribal trust land and land owned by
individual Indians. The day after the lodge opened, the tribes
barricaded the access road to it, at the request of one of the
families, across whose land the road lay. The Tribal Joint Business
Council gave order to block the road. The plaintiffs sought a
remedy with the tribal court but were refused access to it.
Thereafter they brought this suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging equal protection and
due process violations of the ICRA. The district court eventually
dismissed the case, holding that in light of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Santa Clara, they could not hear the
case because tribal sovereign immunity from suit had not been
waived by the ICRA nor had jurisdiction been granted.
The owners of Dry Creek Lodge appealed the district court's
decision following Santa Clara to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth
Circuit distinguished Santa Clara by the fact that it was entirely
an internal matter between tribal members and the tribal government with no non-Indians involved. The Tenth Circuit then held
that the tribes' sovereign immunity from suit had been waived
under the ICRA as to suits brought by non-Indians and stated
that if not for the federal forum the plaintiffs would have no
remedy. In his dissenting opinion, although Judge Holloway conceded that Dry Creek was a far cry from Santa Clarain its factual
setting, he nevertheless felt the court's broad statements in Santa
Clara, i.e., "In the absence here of any unequivocal expression of
contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against the tribe
under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit,"
barred this action because of the immunity doctrine.
1. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
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TAXATION: Income Derived From Trust Lands
In United States v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1980),

Anderson, a member of the Fort Peck Tribes and a cattle rancher, had an individual allotment of land held in trust by the
United States. However, Anderson grazed his cattle on other Indian allotments held in trust by the United States. The federal
government conceded that Anderson's income' from his own
allotment was tax-free but sought to collect taxes on his income
allocable to his use of other trust land. The district court, relying
upon the federal policies underlying the Indian Reorganization
Act,' held such income could not be taxed. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, saying, "Indians are subject to payment of federal in-come taxes, as are [other] citizens, unless an exemption from taxation can be found in the language of a Treaty or Act of Congress." Therefore, policy can create no federal income tax exemption unless created expressly. The court then examined the
General Allotment Act3 and the Indian Reorganization Act 4 but
found no such express exemption in either. In Squire v.
Capoeman,5 the General Allotment Act was construed to create
an express tax exemption for an Indian deriving income directly
from his own trust allotment. The reason behind this construction was to insure that at the end of the trust period the lands
would remain unencumbered by tax liens in the hand of the allottee. However, the Ninth Circuit held that this case did not fall
within Capoeman because the income the government is seeking
to tax did not come from his own trust land and because obviously taxing his use of other trust land would not encumber that land
which is not allotted to him. The court further held that section 5
of the Indian Reorganization Act created no federal tax exemption in that it only expressly exempted trust land from state and
local taxation, with no mention being made of a federal exemption. In addition, the court reasoned that section 16 of the Indian
Reorganization Act could not be used to assert an exemption
because the Fort Peck Tribes voted against it, and even if it could
be relied upon, no provision in a tribal constitution could limit
the taxing power of the United States, a superior sovereign.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

25 U.S.C. § 466 (1934).
Id. at § 913.
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1887).
25 U.S.C. § 466 (1934).
531 U.S. 1 (1956).
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TAXATION: State Motor Carrier and Fuel Taxes on
Reservations
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S.Ct. 2578
(1980), the United States Supreme Court held that federal law
preempts Arizona from imposing motor carrier and fuel taxes on
non-Indian businesses that operate solely on Indian reservations.
Pursuant to a contract with the Fort Apache Timber Company, a tribal organization, the Pinetop Logging Company, a
non-Indian enterprise authorized to do business in Arizona, felled
tribal timber on the Fort Apache Reservation and transported it
to the tribal organization sawmill. Pinetop's operations were performed solely on the reservation.
The state of Arizona sought to impose on Pinetop its motor
carrier license tax, which is assessed on the basis of the carrier's
gross receipts, and its use fuel tax, which is assessed on the basis
of diesel fuel used to propel a motor vehicle on any highway
within the state. Pinetop paid the taxes under protest and brought
suit in state court, asserting that under federal law the taxes could
not lawfully be imposed on logging activities conducted exclusively
within the reservation or on hauling activities on Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal roads. The state trial court held for the
state and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.
In reversing, the Supreme Court recognized two independent
barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over reservation Indians. First, the exercise of the state's authority may be
preempted by federal law. Second, it may unlawfully infringe on
the right of the reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be governed by them. The Court, therefore, reasoned that the
federal government's regulation of the harvesting, sale, and
management of tribal timber, and of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal roads is so pervasive as to preclude the additional
burden sought to be imposed here by assessing the taxes in question against Pinetop for operations that are conducted solely on
BIA and tribal roads within the reservation. The Court concluded
that "there is no room for these taxes in the comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme."'

1. 100 S.Ct. at 2586.
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TAXATION: State Privilege Tax
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967 (10th
Cir. 1980), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court decision
that upheld the right of New Mexico to impose its gross receipts
tax on contractors who performed work on the Mescalero Reservation, located within the state. The court stated that the tax was
imposed directly on the contractors for the privilege of doing
business within the state. The court went on to say that this case
did not involve the taxing of Indian lands, nor income from such
lands, nor Indian land generally, all of which the state recognizes
no right to tax. The court reasoned that all the case concerned
was the right of the state to impose a privilege tax on contractors
doing business within the state. The fact that it may indirectly
burden the Mescalero Tribe through indemnity agreements or increased costs did not, the court held, make it a tax on the tribe.
In considering whether the indirect burden imposed by the state
law constituted an interference with tribal self-government and
internal affairs, the court dismissed this contention, reasoning
that the indirect burden suffered by the Mescalero Tribe was the
same indirect tax consequence suffered by all engaged in
business. The tax is nondiscriminatory, reasoned the court, hence
there is no interference with tribal internal affairs.
TAXATION: State Transaction Privilege Tax Preempted
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm "n, 100 S. Ct. 2592

(1980), presented the question whether a state may tax the sale of
farm machinery to an Indian tribe when the sale took place on an
Indian reservation and was made by a corporation that did not
reside on the reservation and was not licensed to trade with Indians. The transaction involved the sale of 11 farm tractors to
Gila River Farms, an enterprise of the Gila River Tribe. The
seller, Central Machinery Company, solicited the sale on the
reservation, the contract was made there, and payment for and
delivery of the tractors also took place there. Although the seller
did not have a permanent place of business on the reservation,
and was not licensed to engage in trade with Indians on reservations, the transaction was approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The state of Arizona, however, imposes a "transaction
privilege tax" on the privilege of doing business within the state.
The seller, therefore, added the amount of this tax-$2,916.62https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/11
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as a separate item to the price of the tractors, thereby increasing
the amount of the total purchase price to Gila River Farms. The
seller then paid the tax to the state under protest and instituted
proceedings to claim a refund, stipulating that Central Machinery
would pay over any tax refund to Gila River Farms. The Superior
Court for Maricopa County held that the state had no jurisdiction to tax the transaction, but the Supreme Court of Arizona
reversed.
Relying upon Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n,' the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
state court. The High Court held that Arizona had no jurisdiction
to impose a tax on the corporation's sale of farm machinery to an
Indian tribe where the sale took place on the reservation even
though the corporation did not have a permanent place of
business on the reservation and was not licensed to trade with Indians. The Court reasoned that since the transaction was plainly
subject to regulation under the federal statutes and implementing
regulations governing the licensing of Indian traders, federal law
preempts the asserted state tax.

1. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
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